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A PROBLEM FOR RELATIVE INFORMATION MINIMIZERS IN PROBABILITY KINEMATICS I Williams
[i980] provides a persuasive and insightful presentation of the view that the correct general principle for probability kinematics is the one that requires minimising the information content of the posterior probability function relative to the prior. This is a view which I have also presented sympathetically [I98o] in a similar context. Further reflection suggests, however, that this Principle needs more intuitive support than it has thus far received. I shall here briefly restate the reasons we have for thinking the principle correct, and then give the sort of example which shows that these reasons do not yet go far enough.
2 Let the agent's prior belief state be characterised by the probability function P and his posterior state by P', defined on the same probability space. Given any measurable partition X on which P is positive (I shall restrict the discussion to this case), the relative information in P with respect to P as measured in X is defined by I(P', P, X) = {P'(A) log (P(A)/P(A)): Ae X} (2-1)
The deliverances of experience place a constraint on what the posterior P should be. For example, in a simple learning experience, the agent accepts the constraint that P'(E) = i, for some proposition E. In the observationby-candlelight examples discussed by Richard Jeffrey [1965] he accepts the 375 would be the Ptolemaic and not the Copernican theory that would permit the comparison of the radii of planetary orbits by Copernicus's geometrical methods. Therefore, to take the possibility of comparing the magnitude of planetary orbits as an indication of the merit of one system over the other is to attribute fundamental significance to the location of humans in the planetary system. Such an attribution may have been appropriate within Aristotelian theory, but it is hardly appropriate now.
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University of Sydney simultaneous constraints that P'(A) = gA for each element A of some partition X. Further possible constraints are that the posterior conditional probability P'(AIB) be r or that the posterior odds P'(A)/P'(B) be s, or that the posterior expectation ExP'(g) be w, where g is some random variable. The last sort is the most general in that all the others can be reformulated in that form.
The Infomin Principle, as I shall call it, now says that the agent should choose his posterior P' so as to satisfy that constraint while minimizing information relative to P. As measured in what partition? Let us restrict our discussion further to the case where there is a finite coarsest relevant partition. In the most general case, the random variable g is constant on each element of the partition, but has different values in different elements thereof. If X is that partition, we can first minimise I(P', P, X); and then minimise I(P, P, X') for all refinements X' of X by setting P'(-IA) = P(-IA) for each A in X. Thus the problem is reduced to minimising relative information in the coarsest relevant partition.
What reasons have we for thinking that the Infomin Principle is correct? (I) In the simple learning case, it gives the same answer as the Bayesian principle of conditionalisation, P' = P(-IE).
(II) In the observation-by-candlelight case, it leads to the same result as Jeffrey's rule, P' = {(gAP(-IA): Ae X}.
(III) If the explication of information content is adequate, then the Infomin Principle is the rule that one should not jump to unwarranted conclusions, or add capricious assumptions, when accommodating one's belief state to the deliverances of experience.
While not jumping to conclusions is a very conservative rule, with no room for bold conjectures or acceptance of merely confirmed hypotheses, one could not very well generalise Bayesian procedures by less conservative means. The weak link in the justification lies of course in the antecedent of III. This can be further supported by reasoning that motivates definition (2-1) as by Hobson [1971] and others. This reasoning is rather abstract, and relies on the acceptance of general desiderata for any definition of information content, which do not strike everyone as equally modest.
There is however an obvious course of action for further testing of Infomin against our intuitions. That is to see what posteriors it prescribes when we have simple constraints of sorts not covered by (I) and (II). When the constraint is a posterior conditional probability or posterior odds for two given propositions--cases which appear to be common at race-tracks, in lying spy examples, and so forth-this might be expected to work well. I have found that in these cases, the rather complicated general formulas of Infomin can be simplified so that a pocket calculator is all the agent needs to police his posterior degrees of belief. The Infomin Principle, given (5-2) and the constraint formulated as in (3) above, should now allow us to determine the unknown. Fed data (3), the Principle gives the following answer:
where m is some constant, and Z a factor inserted solely to make P' sum to unity on X. Hence (5-3) tells us that the posterior odds vector must take the form: It seems now to me that we may very well have the beginnings here of the required further justification for Infomin. For obviously the two procedures should agree in any case where both are applicable, and just as obviously they could not agree in this limiting case if Infomin never affected the probability of being in the Blue Region in response to the sort of input in question. Continuity considerations (such as that this posterior probability should vary continuously with q) if themselves sufficiently well motivated, may then help to remove our initial misgivings about the proffered posterior. DD 
